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THE CONSTITUTION AFTER WATERGATEt
WILLLAm F. SwnmLER*
I. "Recurrence to Fundamental Principles"
That no free government, nor the blessings of liberty, can be preserved
to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temper-
ance, frugality, and virtue; [and] by frequent recurrence to funda-
mental principles....j
The constitutional crisis of 1973-1974 generated many issues, some
political and others judicial, some more or less disposed of by events, and
others left unanswered, possibly forever. What is perhaps more important
are the jurisprudential questions which also emerged from the welter of
facts-stranger-than-fiction: the uses of governmental power and the stan-
dards for restraints upon the power or its uses. These questions in turn
directed attention to basic theory in which American constitutional prac-
tice presumably has its roots. Counsel for congressional committees, for
judicial agencies such as grand juries, and for the executive branch all
drafted elaborate arguments for the construction and application of
original theory and subsequent legal history.' Now that the era of crisis is
presumably receding, two opportunities emerge: (1) the chance to review,
t Based on an enrichment lecture delivered at the College of Law, University of Okla-
homa, November 8,1974.
* John Marshall Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Visiting Distinguished
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, Fall 1974. Author, Court and Constitution in the
20th Century (New York, 3 vol., 1969,1970, 1974).
2 VA. CoNsr. (Declaration of Rights), I, § 15.
2United States v. Ehrlfichman, 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Application of Senate Select Comm., 361 F.
Supp. 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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in the perspective of the Watergate tragedy, the theories or fundamental
principles on which the American constitutional system bases its claim to
legitimacy, and (2) the chance to evaluate the effects of legislative and
judicial events of 1973-1974 upon that system.
Separation of Powers: The Basic Theory
In the course of recent events, a dictum of one of the Founding Fa-
thers-James Madison-emerged as a fundamental principle: Separation
of powers, Madison maintained, in practice was a check-and-balance sys-
tem of interdependence; "unless these [separate] departments be so far
connected and blended, as to give each a constitutional controul over the
others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to
a free government, can never in practice, be duly maintained.' ' The Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787, and most of the state conventions ante-
cedent to it,4 had been committed to a theory of government articulated
by Montesquieu5 which eschewed concentration of several functions of
government within one person or office.
At the same time, Madison acknowledged that separate powers are
not in all circumstances equal; each department, in the nature of things,
tends to accumulate more power to itself, he observed, and of the three the
legislative department has a unique advantage:
Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less susceptible
of precise limits, it can with greater facility, mask under complicated and
indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate
departments .... Nor is this all: As the legislative department alone has
access to the pockets of the people, and has in some Constitutions full dis-
cretion, and in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of
those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the
latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former."
If national experience has tempered some of Madison's generalities,
the fact remains that congressional surveillance of at least the executive
branch of government was intended as a check upon that branch. The
Senate Select (Watergate) Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
noted in its Final Report the continuing responsibility of "acquainting
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the
3 TE FEDERALIST, No. 48 (Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
4 Cf., inter alia, VA. CONST. (1776), p. 2; MaS. CONST. (1780), art. xxx; U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 6, ci. 2.
5 MoNTEs QuI, DEL' Esprr DFS Lois (Truc ed. 1961).
6 T E FEDERALIST, No. 48 (Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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government" which was vested in Congress, "to oversee the administra-
tion of executive agencies... and to inform the public of any wrongdoing
or abuses it uncovers."1 Although the supervisory function of the legisla-
tive branch was exercised without executive branch resistance in the early
days of national history," the requirements for a more independent execu-
tive and the personality of men like Andrew Jackson in the presidency
soon interposed bounds to congressional initiative in this area.'
"Having separated the three great departments by a broad line from
each other," wrote Joseph Story in 1833, "the difficult task remains to pro-
vide some practical means for the security of each against the meditated
or occasional invasions of the others."' 0 While the judicial branch, in
Story's view and later in the view of Chief Justice Taney, - was not an
appropriate medium for enforcing such security, the Court in the follow-
ing century did in fact set up certain guidelines and limits. Where no legis-
lative purpose was apparent, or where the congressional inquiry related
to matters in litigation, the Court defined the authority narrowly, vis-d-vis
the investigators; 12 where allegations of malfeasance in executive offices
were the basis of the inquiry, the Court was disposed to treat the investi-
gative authority broadly. 3 The Watergate Committee defined its functions
in terms of the standards set out in the latter group of cases, 4 and con-
cluded that its primary public responsibility was to interpret its own man-
date broadly so that both Congress and the American people would be
reminded that the basic objective of checks and balances cannot be at-
tained without "steadfast vigilance of the conduct of the public officials
they choose to lead them."' 5
Powers, Privileges, and Prerogatives
Much confusion was generated in the Watergate crisis from the fact
that the executive power is stated only in general terms in Article II of the
7 FiNAL REPORT OF T33iE SELECT Comm. ON PRESiDENTIAL CAmPAIGN Acrrvrns. S. REP.
No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., xxiv [hereinafter cited as FMiAL REPORT (Watergate)], quoting
from United States v. Rumell, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953).
8 Cf. 10 ANNALS Or CONG. 786f (1800).
9 H. REP. No. 194, 24th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 12 (1837).
10 2 1. STORY, COIMENTARMS ON T CONsmUTION OF THE UrTm STATES, § 529 (1st
ed. 1833).
11 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 618 (1850).
12 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111, 112 (1959) ; Watkins v. United States,
354U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
13 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 170-74 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168,189 (1881).14 FINAL REPORT (Watergate), at xxdv.
15 Id. at xxv.
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Constitution itself, while the truth is that executive independence has
broadened under the influence of aggressive holders of the presidential
office. For Thomas Jefferson, any exercise of power by the executive which
was not spelled out in Article II was questionable, at least until ratified by
Congress." But Andrew Jackson did not hesitate to challenge Congress
by unilateral action in the matter of the Second Bank of the United States,'
while Theodore Roosevelt found his authority for action in "what was
imperatively necessary for the Nation" where no specific constitutional
bar could be cited. 8 Thus, in a century's span, the executive view of its
own power went from one extreme to another, with little disposition on
the part of Congress to challenge the process.
Not only was this attribute of executive independence derived from
inferences concerning the nature of the office, but it came to be defined by
a term-"executive privilege." The term "privilege" appears in the Con-
stitution in another context, or pair of contexts. Both of these usages are
distinguishable from the Article II context which both President Nixon
and his adversaries read into the latter. Article I, Section 6 refers to
privileges of congressmen amounting to limited immunities from arrest,19
while Article IV, Section 2 speaks of "privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States," a concept even further removed from the type
of "privilege" being read into Article II.20
What is really meant, at least in part, vis-d-vis the executive's inde-
pendence of initiative, is what in British constitutional usage is called
prerogative, or the residual authority of the sovereign (i.e., executive)
subject to Parliamentary curtailment. Lord Coke's statement-"the King
hath no prerogative but that which the law of the land allows him"21-
defines the nature and limit of independent executive power in Britain.
While the fundamental difference between the American and British consti-
tutional process is the absence of a separation of powers principle in the
latter," the fact is that the absence of a specific provision for privilege/
prerogative in Article II of the United States Constitution, considered to-
gether with the Founding Fathers' assumption of legislative supremacy in
16 Cf. E. BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PuRCHASE 1803-1812
(1920).
17 Cf. M. JA S, PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT (1936).
18 T. ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 357 (1925).
19 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6.
20 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2.
21 Case of Proclamations [16101 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1354 (1610).
22 Cf. 0. HOOD PnML.IPS, CONSTIrUTIONAr aND AincmSTRATIV LAW, 14-15 (5th ed.
1973).
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the Parliamentary tradition, points to a narrow scope for the independent
initiative of the President, even when its existence may be assumed.
The question of presidential power has assumed its primary importance
in the twentieth century 2 -i.e., in the period of increasing need to rely on
a central and promptly responsive authority in a world of rapidly appear-
ing challenges. The demand for executive initiative was generated by the
pressures of economic emergency in the depression decade of the 1930's,
and led Franklin D. Roosevelt to a great expansion of the use of the execu-
tive order on the domestic scene, while executive agreements on the for-
eign 4 scene were vastly accelerated by the necessities of World War II
and particularly by the postwar continuance of emergency powers as duly
sustained by the courts.2 5
The centralized federal executive contrasts sharply with the prevail-
ing principle of the "divided executive" in most state constitutional sys-
tems,2" so that judicial construction of the state executive article is hardly
enlightening on this particular question, aside from explaining Alexander
Hamilton's reassurance that the restrictions upon the federal executive
purposely were made stronger than those laid upon state governors.27 Con-
versely, Story conceded the necessity of "incidental powers, belonging to
the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature
of the functions which are confided to it," '21 while Marshall found Article
II vesting in the President "certain important political powers, in the exer-
cise of which he is to use his own discretion. 9
With the growth of the administrative process into a virtually au-
tonomous branch of the executive, the need to review the legitimacy of
administrative authority eventually led the courts to pronouncement of
the "intelligible standard" doctrine of agency in government. 0 No com-
parable doctrine of general applicability to the executive branch itself has
been suggested, so that in 1973 both legislative and judicial branches
groped for a means to reconcile, and apply, a principle of accountability
to executive privilege. Who is to define matters of national interest or
2 Cf. NEUSTAmT, PRESIDN PowER, chs. 2, 3, 5 (1960).
24 2 W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20Ta CENTURY, THE NEW LEGALITY,
1932-1968, ch. 7, app. D (1970).
2 5 W1oods v. Lloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) ; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944).
20 Cf. Swindler, Executive Power in State and Federal Constitutions, 1 HAsT. CoNST.
L.Q. 21 (1974).2 7 Tim FEDERAIT, No. 70 (Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
28 3 1. STORY, COmISENTARjEs, § 1563, at 418, supra note 10.
2 9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137,165 (1803).
3OAmerican Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Sunshine Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,398 (1940).
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security, and who is to limit executive privilege to this definition? What
form is accountability to take, and to which branch of government does
it run with respect to the President-to the judicial only, to the legislative
only, or to both? What are the criteria for evaluating executive behavior,
and what are the options in the event that the evaluation is negative and
condemnatory?
Reviewability: The Judicial Check. Article II unequivocally states:
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America."'" In terms of governmental structure, this was a major de-
parture from the Articles of Confederation, creating a separate branch
which had not existed under the Confederation and-what is more im-
portant-making this office independent of Congress, the incumbent being
elected by a separate, elite group. The fact that the Electoral College never
functioned in the manner originally envisioned did not affect the inde-
pendence of the executive from the legislative branch, except in the case
of "advice and consent" of the Senate in matters of presidential appoint-
ments and treaty making."
Nevertheless, as Justice Robert H. Jackson has observed, there is a
. . . poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to
concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enig-
matic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.83
Hamilton, on the other hand, saw the executive power as defined by the
nature of the function:
The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive au-
thority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would render
it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was designed as a
substitute for those terms, when antecedently used .... The general doctrine
of our Constitution then is, that the executive power of the nation is vested
in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which
are expressed in the instrument 8 4
Madison criticized this broad inference of executive power with the com-
ment that "the most penetrating jurist would be unable to scan the extent
of constructive prerogative.
'35
31 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
32 Cf. J. HART, Tim AmERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION, 1789 (1948); C. TAinr, Tim
CREATION oFTHE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789 (1922).
-3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
34 7 HAmILTON, Wolxs, 80-81 (J.C. Hamilton, ed., 1851).
35 1 1MADIsoN, LmTs, 654 (1865).
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The ambivalent and occasionally contradictory approach to the sub-
ject of independent executive initiative is strikingly illustrated in the con-
clusions of William Howard Taft at the beginning and end of a 10-year
period, 1916-1926. At the beginning, taking an academic view of the office
he had recently held, Taft wrote:
The true view of the Executive function is, as I conceive it, that the Presi-
dent can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to
some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such
express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.... There is no unde-
fined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to
be in the public interest.2 6
Whether this statement was prompted by the continued assertions of his
erstwhile colleague and subsequent Bull Moose third-term candidate,
Theodore Roosevelt,37 circumstances at the end led Taft as Chief Justice
to declare:
In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the power of ap-
pointment to executive office carries with it, as a necessary incident, the
power of removal.... It could never have been intended to leave the Con-
gress unlimited discretion to vary fundamentally the operation of the great
independent executive branch of government and thus most seriously to
weaken it.38
The majority opinion in Myers v. United States 9 thus gave substan-
tial judicial support to the Hamiltonian thesis of inherent executive power,
but within the decade, the Court, under Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes, specifically limited the particular power with which Myers was
concerned-the right of the President to remove an officer whose appoint-
ment had been subject to "advice and consent" without a similar check
upon the act of removal. Humphrey's Executor v. United States4" was fol-
lowed the next year by United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,41 in
which the Court sought to distinguish between maximum independence of
executive initiative in the area of foreign affairs, and minimum indepen-
dence in the area of domestic affairs. Justice George Sutherland, speaking
for the Court, contended that in the latter area, the power of the national
government derived from powers carved from those of the states, while
in the former area, it descended upon the United States from the sover-
SOW. TAa'r, OuR Cm MAGisTaATr AND His PowEas, 139-40 (1916).
37 Cf. T. Roosevelt, supra note 18.
38 Myers v. United States, 222 U.S. 52 (1926).
S9 d. at 126.
40 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
4 1 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1975]
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
eignty of Great Britain to which, as a national government, it succeeded.42
Although both of Sutherland's premises may be challenged,48 for the most
part, his doctrine of executive latitude in the area of foreign affairs has re-
mained the basic rule.44
The concept of an inherent power of independent discretionary action
by the executive, in the area of domestic affairs, has been increasingly sub-
jected to judicial circumscription. In 1952, in the Steel Seizure Case,45 a
widely divided Court declared, in an opinion read by Justice Hugo Black,
that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker," 46 and requires rather that his
actions be subject to legislative guidelines. Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion stated: "The actual art of governing under our Constitution does
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from con-
text.... Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. 47 Jackson sought to
illustrate this last statement by an oft-quoted distinction:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied author-
ization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter .... 48
Twenty years later, the Court spoke with a more nearly unanimous
voice in United States v. United States District Court,40 in declaring un-
constitutional a claim of discretionary presidential power to authorize
electronic surveillance in domestic security cases without warrant. Justice
42 Id. at 319-16.
43 Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
44 Cf. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1968).
45 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 519 (1952).
4 6 Id. at 587.
4 7 Id. at 635.
4 8 Id. at 635-36.
49 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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Lewis Powell for the Court held that first amendment and fourth amend-
ment safeguards refuted a claim of executive discretion: "The danger to
political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so
vague a concept as the power to protect 'domestic security.' 0 In 1971,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed that no of-
ficer of the executive branch could properly be considered as the sole and
final judge of the scope of his own discretionary power,5 and two years
later, the Supreme Court found itself unable to take jurisdiction in matters
of executive discretion where Congress had expressly waived any legisla-
tive conditions for the exercise of executive power. 52 Because the case
turned upon the executive secrecy provision of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 3 the majority opinion pointed out, it was entirely within the power
of Congress to amend the statute and dispose of the jurisdictional bar.54
Review of executive power in terms of legislative limits and con-
ditions has thus been asserted by the judiciary in a line of decisions which
extended consistently from 1926 to the eve of Watergate. What remained
to be settled-as it was settled, to a degree, in several judicial tests in the
course of Watergate-was the question of direct review of executive action
on the issue of inherent powers in the presidential office.
Accountability: The Legislative Check. Direct review of executive
action by the legislative branch has not been considered compatible with
the separation of powers theory, and one of the more abrasive disputes be-
tween Congress and the White House in the course of the Watergate affair
was the contention that executive privilege and/or executive immunity
could be asserted by the President at his option in matters of appearance
and testimony by witnesses from the executive department. 5 Certainly
it is not possible to claim a constitutional obligation to comply with such
requests in the manner of British constitutional practice, where-there
being no separation of powers doctrine in the American sense-members
of the executive branch (the "Government" under the incumbent Prime
Minister) are members of the sitting Parliament and, hence, directly sub-
ject to its discipline and jurisdiction."
For this same reason, it is not practical to consider authorizing a con-
gressional vote of "no confidence" in the Parliamentary sense, even by
amending the Constitution for such a purpose, if anything is to be pre-
50 Id. at 321.
51 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (1971).
52 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
53 Pub. L. 90-23 (90th Cong., 2d Sess.), 5 U.S.C. § 552.
54 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973).
55 Cf. FnrAI REPORT (Watergate), at 1080-1081.
5O 0. Hood PHILLiPs, supra note 22, at ch. 8, 15.
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served of the separation of powers doctrine.17 The use of the investigatory
power of Congress, as in the case of the Select Committee, is the most ap-
parent practical medium for legislative oversight of executive/administra-
tive action, and in its Final Report, the Select Committee recommended a
strengthening of the process to this end: more specific authority in the
courts to enforce committee subpoenas, creation of an Office of Congres-
sional Legal Services, and broader authority in committees to compel testi-
mony of witnesses0 8
While frequent references were made, in the course of Watergate and
related investigations, to instances of compliance or noncompliance by
executive officers with congressional requests for testimony or documents,
the subsequent appearance of President Gerald R. Ford before the House
Committee on the Judiciary to explain his reasons for pardoning former
President Nixon 9 may prove to be a clearer precedent for the future. If
so, it may make more practical the accountability process itself. Few
examples of analogous proceedings are to be found; the congressional
inquiries of the Harding administration never involved the highest echelons
of the executive office, even though Cabinet officers were affected, 0 and
impeachment investigations of executive department officers offer little in
the way of procedural guidelines.0
Judicial recognition of the investigative power of Congress, generally
speaking, has been unequivocal; "the power of inquiry-with process to
enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function," wrote Justice Van Devanter for a unanimous Court in 1927.
"Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain
what is needed." 2 In 1957, although he warned that the congressional
power could not be used merely for fishing expeditions, Chief Justice War-
ren affirmed the broad scope of investigatory authority used properly for
fact-finding for legislative purposes.
The power .. is inherent in the legislative process .... It encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed
or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,
57 Cf. H.J. Res. No. 903, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., and notes 130,134 infra.
58 FNA REPORT (Watergate), at 1084-1085.
59 Cf. notes 119, 124, 131 infra.
6o Cf. Hearings before Senate Public Lands and Surveys Comm., 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924).
61 Cf. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, IMPEACH2SENT: SELECTED MATEIALS ON PROCE-
DuRE, 607ff. (1973).
62 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927).
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economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to
remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal gov-
ernment to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. 3
With this categorical affirmation of the inherent power of the legisla-
tive department to hold all other branches of government to account, Con-
gress was presumably equipped with proper authority to demand informa-
tion in the Watergate affair. What still remained unanswered, as became
evident in the course of the involvement of all three branches of govern-
ment, was the question of inherent powers of the executive and the cir-
cumstances under which these might require restraint or denial of either
review or accountability.
II. Moral or Pyrrhic Victory?
After the battle of Asculum, the Greek conqueror Pyrrhus is said to
have declared, "Another victory such as this, and I am lost." In juxtaposi-
tion might be placed the observation of Alice in Wonderland: "Everything
has a moral, if one only knew what it was." Within these admonitory
frames of reference, the practical consequences of Watergate as a consti-
tutional crisis may be assessed. The legislative process which began with
the Senate Select Committee and climaxed in the report on impeachment
recommendations by the House Judiciary Committee; the judicial role
which began with Judge John Sirica's professional suspicion of the readi-
ness of the apprehended Watergate burglars to plead guilty and led to fun-
damental conflicts within the executive department, with the special
prosecutor under the Attorney General seeking to compel the Chief Execu-
tive to comply with demands for evidence; the unanticipated uses to which
the twenty-fifth amendment of the Constitution was put in the Agnew and
Nixon resignations and the Ford and Rockefeller appointments-these
cataclysmic impacts upon the American constitutional system, occurring
in the vortex of a world economic crisis, will require substantial time for
evaluation and final judgment. One thing, at least, is clear-Watergate
left a permanent mark upon all three of the separate powers of govern-
ment; but, like Alice, we do not yet fully understand what it may have been.
III. The Effect of the Congressional Inquiries
The Senate Select Committee
On February 3, 1973, Senator Sam Ervin introduced the resolution cre-
ating the Select Committee "to conduct an investigation and study of the
03 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,187 (1957).
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extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were en-
gaged in by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others,
in the presidential election of 1972, or any campaign, canvass, or other
activity related to it."64 On November 2, 1973, Senator Ervin, now in his
capacity of chairman of this committee, sought and obtained from Con-
gress (1) endorsement of its use of subpoena powers as against the Presi-
dent himself as "a person whose activities the Select Committee is author-
ized.. . to investigate," (2) approval of the Committee's action in seeking
judicial enforcement of its subpoenas, and (3) formal declaration that
both of these steps were essential to "the furtherance of valid legislative
purposes, to wit, a determination of the need for the scope of corrective
legislation... and, in that connection, the informing of the public of the
extent of illegal, improper, or unethical activities that occurred .... ,
While the effort to secure judicial enforcement of the Committee's sub-
poenas was not pursued to a final decision,66 primarily because of the rapid
development of other events, both in the courts and in the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the scope of authority vested in the Select Com-
mittee may be assumed to have been confirmed by these other events in the
courts themselves, corroborating prior judicial pronouncements.
There remain the findings and recommendations of the Select Com-
mittee itself, addressed to specific abuses uncovered in the many volumes
of testimony throughout the Committee's existence. These may best be
evaluated by recapitulating the formal recommendations made in the Final
Report, together with a commentary on the state of legislation to the pres-
ent, in prospective implementation thereof. If congressional response has
not been swift, it must in fairness be noted-as the former President fre-
quently noted-that the prolonged concern with Watergate had diverted
congressional attention from many pressing national and international
issues which, once the immediate crisis was past, could no longer be sub-
ordinated. The recommendations of the Select Committee, for the present
at least, will serve to define the vulnerable stress points in our govern-
mental system.
1. The Watergate Break-in and Cover-up
Committee recommendations: 1. Creation of an Office of Public At-
14 S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973), in FiNxA RaEior (Watergate), at 1231.
65 S. Res. 194, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973), id. at 1245.
66 Application of the United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ; Act of Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87
Stat. 736.
67 Cf. cases cited at note 2 supra.
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torney. 2. Revision of the Federal Criminal Code to make a separate felony
of conspiratorial interference with political nominating and election
processes. 3. Prohibition of White House activities relating to national and
domestic security except as explicitly authorized by Congress. 4. More
comprehensive and frequent congressional examinations of the activities
of the existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 5. Amendment
and strengthening of criminal laws on perjury in testimony before congres-
sional committees. 6. Reconsideration of proposals to broaden defenses to
"mistake of law" allegations. 7. Review of provisions in the Omnibus Crime
and Safe Streets Act of 196868 relating to electronic surveillance.69
Of these seven recommendations-presumably in order of impor-
tance-the first, concerning creation of a new Office of Public Attorney, is
the most innovative. As the Committee's black-letter proposal puts it, this
officer
... would have jurisdiction to prosecute criminal cases in which there is a
real or apparent conflict of interest within the executive branch. The Public
Attorney would also have jurisdiction to inquire into (with power to gain
access to executive records) the status and progress of complaints and
criminal charges concerning matters pending in or involving the conduct
of Federal departments and regulatory agencies.7
In commenting on this recommendation, the Committee's Final Report
stated:
The Public Attorney we recommend would not only be a "special
prosecutor" but an ombudsman having power to inquire into the admin-
istration of justice in the executive branch. With the power of access to
executive records, he could appropriately respond to complaints from the
public, the Congress, the courts and other public and private institutions.
If he became aware of misconduct in the executive branch, he could assume
the role of special prosecutor. The Public Attorney should also be required
to make periodic reports to Congress on the affairs of his office and the need
for new legislation within his jurisdiction, a function which should be of
great assistance to the relevant congressional oversight committeesY1
The Committee concluded that such an office could be created without
substantial change in existing statutes. It recommended that by amending
the current immunity statute," "use" immunity could be granted by the
independent prosecutor without requiring that he secure the consent of
08 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 147.
69 FiL Ry oRT (Watergate), at 96-106.
7 01d. at 96.
71 Id. at 96-97.
72 Cf. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 929.
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the Attorney General, and that power of judicial appointment could readily
be found in the constitutional provision that "Congress may by law vest
the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 78
As for other recommendations, a variety of proposals were dropped
into the Senate hopper in the closing weeks of the Ninety-Third Congress,
the most significant being Senator Ervin's omnibus S. 422 7, "to implement
certain reforms ... recommended by the Senate Select Committee. .. ."
This bill would be cited, if enacted into law, as the "Watergate Reorganiza-
tion and Reform Act of 1974."14 In effect, it would supersede a series of
proposals introduced over the 12-month period from December 1973
through December 1974, viz.:
S. 2803 (December 12, 1973), to insure the separation of constitu-
tional powers by establishing the Department of Justice as an independent
establishment of the United States.
S. 2978 (February 7, 1974), to establish a special commission to study
the establishment of an independent permanent mechanism for the investi-
gation and prosecution of official misconduct and other offenses committed
by high Government officials.
S. 3652 (June 17, 1974), to insure the separation of constitutional
powers and to insure the administration of justice with respect to the com-
mission of crimes by officers and employees of the executive branch of the
Federal Government, and with respect to Federal elections, to remove en-
forcement responsibilities in such cases from individuals with actual or
apparent conflicts of interest, and to establish an independent Public Prose-
cutor.
S. 4010 (September 17, 1974), to establish an independent Public
Attorney to further insure the separation of constitutional powers and the
administration of justice.
S.J. Res. 246 (September 30, 1974), authorizing the Office of Water-
gate Special Prosecution Force to investigate and report on White House
crimes and conferring power to compel testimony and subpoena relevant
tapes and documents. 75
Among the foregoing, S. 2803, S. 3652, and S. 4010 were products of Sen-
ator Ervin's subcommittee on separation of powers, which was established
in 1967 and has accounted for a number of publications, including hearings
73 U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
74 This bill was introduced Dec. 12, 1974. To date it has not been scheduled for public
hearings.
75 In support of the first two bills, cf. Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before Subcom-
mittee on Separation of Powers, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), published under title, Removing
Politics From the Administration of Justice.
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and reports, on separation of powers, procedures for a federal constitu-
tional convention,"0 congressional oversight of administrative agencies and
-two years before Watergate began-a 63S-page study of executive priv-
ilege.77
Changes within the Federal Criminal Code which may reflect Water-
gate-related reforms have of necessity been merged into the continuing
study of a comprehensive revision of the Code itself.78 Other recommenda-
tions in the Select Committee's Final Report, many of which are impliedly
to be implemented in S. 42 2 7, may be succinctly summarized as follows.
2. Campaign Practices
Recommendations: 1. Legislation making criminal the employment
of persons in election campaigns for sabotage or obstruction of the efforts
of opponents. 2. More stringent definition of election law violations. 3. New
laws to strengthen laws against unauthorized taking of records or papers
privately held by political opponents. 4. Stricter criminal liability for im-
personating candidates for political office."
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 19740 were
launched as a Senate bill8 ' and reported out 2 considerably before the
Select Committee had concluded its primary work, and certainly some time
before its Final Report was prepared. Accordingly, the draftsmen had only
the benefit of the piecemeal hearings of the Watergate investigation 3 and
only took into account such specific recommendations of the Final Report
as had become manifest by the time Public Law 93-443 was enacted. Ex-
cept as other recommendations have been reflected in S. 4227, therefore-
and when and as the latter becomes law-the campaign reforms defined
76 The efforts in the late 1960's to petition Congress to call the first general constitu-
tional convention since 1787 is critically analyzed in Swindler, The Current Challenge to Fed-
eralism: The Confederating Proposals, 52 GEo. L.J. 1 (Fall, 1963). This movement was essen-
tially an attack on Supreme Court malapportionment holdings. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) and would have affected another aspect of separation of powers in constitutional theory,
i.e., state-federal powers.
77 Cf. Hearings on S. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973), published under title, Executive
Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive.
78 Cf. Continuing series of hearings before Senate Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974).
79 FnAl. REPORT (Watergate), at 211-14.
80 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443; 88 Stat. 1263.
81 S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
82 S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
83 More than two dozen volumes of Watergate hearings were ultimately published by
the Ervin Committee, including an appendix in two parts, separately titled, Legal Documents
Relating to the Select Committee Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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in the Final Report do not reflect any concerted congressional interest in
implementing legislation.
3. Incumbency Practices
Recommendations: 1. Illegal uses of government resources by in-
cumbents to perpetuate their own tenure to be the particular concern of
the Public Attorney. 2. A Federal Elections Commission to gather informa-
tion on these practices to be furnished to the Public Attorney. 3. Stricter
criminal liability for violating election laws in this manner. 4. Upgrading
to the status of a felony of the offense out in 18 U.S.C. 595 (political use
of federal grants). 5. Strengthening of provisions in 18 U.S.C. 611 and 18
U.S.C. 602 concerning kickbacks by government contractors. 6. Enlarge-
ment of the Hatch Act84 to include more government employees and par-
ticularly the Attorney General who must enforce the law. 7. Greater con-
gressional oversight of election practices.85
4. Campaign Financing
Recommendations: 1. A nonpartisan Federal Election Commission
to replace the present election certifying triumvirate of the Clerk of the
House, Secretary of the Senate, and Office of Federal Elections of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office. 2. Legal limit of $100 in individual cash contribu-
tions to election campaigns. 3. Legal requirement that a candidate for
presidential office designate a single committee of his political group to
manage campaign funds. 4. Statutory maximum for campaign expendi-
tures. 5. A related law limiting the time in which campaign contributions
may be made and reported. 6. Liberalized tax credits for campaign con-
tributions properly made and reported. 7. Negative action on public financ-
ing of campaigns. 8. Prohibition of contributions from foreign nationals.
9. Prohibition of campaign fund solicitation by former government em-
ployees (e.g., obviously, former Attorney General John Mitchell) for a
period of one year after termination of such employment. 10. Limitations
on contributions by organizations of various types in election campaigns.
11. Making a felony of such contributions by individuals."0
From the two preceding groups of recommendations, it is evident that
the Final Report was devolving into a congeries of collateral matters which
have sporadically surfaced in discussions of improved election practices.
Recommendation No. 10 obviously related to the famous "Milk Fund,"
84 53 Stat. 1147.
85 FiNAL REPORT (Watergate), at 442-44.
86 Id. at 564-77.
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which was scrutinized in detail in Chapter 5 of the Report, while Chapters
6, 7, and 8 reported, without specific recommendations, on the Committee's
findings in the campaigns of Hubert Humphrey and Wilbur Mills and on
the Hughes-Rebozo investigation.87 So far as the Committee recommenda-
tions from Chapters 3 to the end of the Final Report are concerned, they
appear to rest upon the fortunes of S. 4227. And in summary, the com-
mittee itself observed:
The improper and unethical activities that occurred ... will not be
eliminated merely by new legislation. Although law seeks both to shape and
reflect the moral and ethical values of individuals, new laws cannot fully
substitute for such individual values. Therefore the political process and
government itself must attract individuals of the highest moral and ethical
standards if the improper activities that occurred in the 1972 Presidential
campaign are to be eliminated completely in the future.88
The House Judiciary Committee
The preceding quotation from the Ervin Committee Report is particu-
larly relevant to the final report of the House Judiciary Committee on
presidential impeachment. The resignation of Mr. Nixon presumably ren-
dered the impeachment proceedings academic or moot. Despite some state-
ments to the contrary," the political realities certainly confirmed this, and
the presidential pardon, discussed infra, ° settled the matter. What re-
mains, then, in the Committee's Report, is a recapitulation of executive
practices which are constitutionally suspect-guidelines for circumspect
behavior in the future.
By the time the House committee had been directed by the full cham-
ber to consider the substance behind a series of impeachment resolutions,91
the Committee had already published the first of a series of studies which
became best sellers of sorts, and these continued into June of 1974.2 Al-
ready, on February 6, 1974, the House had adopted another resolution
directing the Committee to make its own determination of the evidence
and report out articles of impeachment if it deemed proper.93 By August
87 Id. at 579-1078.
88 Id. at 213.
89 Cf. generally, R. BERGER, ImxP E CHNT: THE CONSTI=tTONAL PROBLEmS (Cam-
bridge, 1973).
90 Cf. notes 119, 124 infra.
91 H. Res. No. 702, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
92 Cf. Impeachment: Selected Materials, published Oct. 1973; Impeachment: Selected
Materials on Procedure, published Jan. 1974; Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment, pub-
lished Feb. 1974; Impeachment Inquiry Procedures, published May 1974; Transcript of Eight
Recorded Presidential Conversations, published May-June 1974.
93 H. Res. No. 803, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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20, 1974, when the Committee had submitted its Final Report, the action
was anticlimactic; not only had live television carried to millions of Amer-
icans the full debate and vote on the articles of impeachment, but Mr.
Nixon had resigned. There remained a record of what the Committee,
ultimately unanimously, and the House, by what was prospectively an
overwhelming majority, had it come to a vote, considered impeachable con-
duct. This record remains as the caveat for executive behavior:
The first article of impeachment concerned the Watergate break-in
and cover-up, and the specific presidential conduct set out therein was that
Mr. Nixon, "using the powers of his high office, engaged personally and
through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan de-
signed to delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of such unlawful
entry; to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible; and to conceal
the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities." 4 Such con-
duct, the Committee concluded, violated "the confidence of the nation"
in the integrity of the presidential office and constituted the type of action
described as "high crimes and misdemeanors" in the impeachment clause
of the Constitution.95
Article II concerned itself with violation of the constitutional rights
of American citizens, through improper use of government agencies and
the information they could gather concerning specific individuals (i.e., the
Ellsberg affair), and Article III related to executive defiance of legislative
demands for records."' While only the first of the three articles ultimately
won total Committee support, the fact remains that this article epitomizes
the standards of constitutional conduct which now become a matter of rec-
ord. To the extent that legislative action (rather than legislation) can spell
out some of the criteria for executive responsibility which have never been
found in the precise language of Article II of the Constitution, the im-
peachment article of August 20, 1974, has become a historic gloss upon
the text.
IV. The Uses of Court-Related Processes
The Special Prosecutor
As the Ervin bill (S. 4227) suggests, the ad hoc approach of the
Watergate prosecution had unavoidable anomalies: Essentially, the ques-
tion which remained unanswered throughout the 1973-1974 crisis was how
94 H. RaP. No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), IMPEACHMENT OF RicHARD M.
NIXoN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, p. 1.
95 Id. at 2.
9 6 Id. at 3,4.
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the objectivity, independence, and integrity of the prosecuting process
could be assured when the executive branch in effect was investigating
itself? 7
As the Select Committee observed in its Final Report, its own re-
course to judicial action occurred in more than 60 instances, including ap-
plications for limited or "use" immunity in the case of 29 separate
witnesses, and four appearances as amicus curiae in actions brought by the
Special Prosecutor. 8 This presents a related and equally fundamental
question of the practical scope of congressional responsibility to pursue its
investigations to active criminal litigation. 9 Thus, the Final Report under-
took to resolve the status of the Special Prosecutor by its recommendation
of a new office of Public Attorney,100 and the role of Congress in criminal
proceedings by its recommended support of a bill already introduced' 0"
which would establish a Congressional Legal Service to be the legislature's((permanent litigation arm."
The Special Prosecutor throughout the Watergate crisis was never
completely cleared of his potentially compromising status. With little legal
or political precedent for his work, °2 he relied ultimately upon public
opinion and Congress' moral support to make effective his independence
of the executive branch of which he was a part. The courts continually
treated him as their officer, despite a lack of any statutory basis for this
policy, and the Prosecutor himself periodically had to petition the courts
to stay legislative as well as executive action. 03
The Final Report recognizes that the improvisations of the Water-
gate Special Prosecutor demand something more definite and certain for
the future. There is, accordingly, much merit in the Ervin bill's proposal to
create "as an independent establishment of the Government the Office of
the Public Attorney," the occupant to be nominated by three retired fed-
eral appellate judges designated for this purpose by the Chief Justice. 04
It is, moreover, only realistic to assume that in the complex and often
anonymous administration of large-scale modern government, there will
07 Cf. Brief of White House counsel in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
8 FnAr. lREor (Watergate), at 1079.
99 Id. at 1080.
100 Cf. S. 4227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
101 S. 2569, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
102 Cf. Hearings on Special Prosecutor and the Watergate Grand Jury, Before Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice, House Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; Hearings . . .on
Special Prosecutor, Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
103 S. 4227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-103 (1974) proposes a new ch. 38 for Title 28,
U.S.C., covering creation of a Public Attorney, defining election offenses, and providing proce-




be continuing opportunity for such an officer to "investigate and prosecute
(1) allegations of corruption in the administration of the laws by the ex-
ecutive branch of the Government; (2) cases referred by the Attorney
General because of actual or potential conflicts of interest; (3) criminal
cases referred to him by the [proposed] Federal Election Commission;
and (4) allegations of violations of Federal laws relating to campaigns and
elections for elective office."' 05
The Tapes Subpoenas
In the two principal constitutional cases growing out of Watergate,'
it became established that no executive/administrative officer, up to and
including the Chief Executive, can be the sole judge of the nature and
extent of his own discretionary power.07 That has now been asserted as
the function of the judiciary; whether there is an identifiable role for the
legislative branch in this area is still an unsettled question°10 8 --and the
Final Report was at pains to criticize the judicial expressions of doubt in
the matter. 0 9
In the first of the major cases, concerning the grand jury effort to
secure White House tapes in the summer of 1973, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia made clear that "even the Chief Executive is
subject to the mandate of the law when he has no valid claim to priv-
ilege,""0 that privilege, as synonymous with discretionary power, does not
mean that "an act is discretionary merely because the President is the
actor,""' and that where privilege (or prerogative) exists, it may yet be
subject to judicially determined limitations."
In the second case, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle of the
1973 intermediate court holding:
... neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confi-
dentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an ab-
solute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process
under all circumstances .... "3
10 5 Id.
106 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) ; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973).
1o0 Cf. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
108 Application of the United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
109 FnAL REPoRT (Watergate), at 1081-1082.
11o Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d, 700, 722 (1973).
1 1 1 Id. at 712.
112 Id. at 713.
11S United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
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We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to sub-
poenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the funda-
mental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal
justice. 14
From the two cases, taken together in the context of the constitutional
crisis of 1973-1974, it now seems established that subpoenas in the case of
formal criminal proceedings may be enforced as against any officer of the
executive branch. To vest in the legislative branch an equally strong sub-
poena power, the Select Committee's Final Report recommended:
The Committee recommends that Congress enact legislation giving the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia jurisdiction over
suits to enforce congressional subpoenas issued to members of the executive
branch, including the President. This statute, which would apply to all
subpoenas issued by congressional bodies, would replace the special statute
passed for and limited to the Select Committee.... The statute should pro-
vide that a congressional body has standing to sue in its own name and in
the name of the United States and may employ counsel of its own choice
in such a suit. The statute should provide that suits brought to enforce
congressional subpoenas must be handled on an expedited basis by the
courts." 5
Whether the vesting of such power in two branches of government as
against the third offers a practical threat to separation of powers as the
operating principle of the American constitutional system is a question
which requires thorough exploration by Congress-e.g., in the jurisdic-
tional provisions in Title III of S. 4227116-- and if enacted, may well re-
quire definition by judicial construction. The record of Congress since
Watergate, in demanding a succession of disclosures by executive agencies
such as the Central Intelligence Agency,1 7 suggests that the legislative
branch, no more than the executive, ought not become the sole and final
judge of its own discretionary powers.
The Presidential Pardon
Perhaps the most spectacular aftermath of the Nixon resignation and
11 4 Id. at 713.
115 FnTAL REPoRT (Watergate), at 1084.
11 6 The Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1974, proposed in S. 4227, would
add a new Chapter 85 to 28 U.S.C., granting jurisdiction over certain civil actions. It would
concern perjury before congressional committees and behavior of witnesses before special
committees.
117 Cf. Hearings on Involvement of Central Intelligence Agency in Watergate Affair




the Watergate crisis was the pardon of the former President by his suc-
cessor on September 8, 1974. While there was only momentary question,
expressed by a few, concerning Mr. Ford's constitutional authority in the
matter,"" the policy and politics of the action evoked more substantial
questions. When Mr. Ford, in a press conference, conceded that accep-
tance of the pardon in his view amounted to admission of guilt,"' the sub-
committee on criminal justice of the House Judiciary Committee invited
the new President to appear before it and explain his reasons for the ac-
tion. Thus, in a final innovation in American constitutional history, the
executive acquiesced in a legislative request which fundamentally affected
the judicial process vis-d-vis a President removed (by his own resigna-
tion) from office who was constitutionally "liable and subject to Indict-
ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment according to Law."' 2
In his statement to the subcommittee, President Ford quoted Hamil-
ton in The Federalist ("a well-timed offer of pardon ... may restore the
tranquillity of the commonwealth"),121 Chief Justice John Marshall ("an
act of grace ... which exempts the individual . . .from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed") ,12 and the modern Court
("the determination by the ultimate authority that the public welfare will
be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed").123 Be-
yond that, Mr. Ford conceded that in the final conversations preceding the
Nixon resignation, "references to a possible pardon" were incidentally
made, but that "there never was at any time any agreement whatsoever
concerning a pardon."' 24
Presidential pardons are seldom newsworthy because they usually
are routine acts following comprehensive administrative study of generally
technical issues.12 5 Of several hundred pardons granted by each President
in the course of a four-year term, the Department of Justice makes no
special effort to develop statistical interpretations of trends . 2  As for the
118 Cf. generally, BluZr HISTORY OF EmERGENCY PowERs iN T= Ummo STATES, a special
report of the Senate Special Comm. on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
119 Cf. Hearings Before Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pub-
lished under title, Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters (Serial No. 60) [hereinafter
cited as Nixon Pardon]. The transcript of the Presidential Press Conference of Sept. 16, 1974,
appears at 161.
120 U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
121 Tim FEDERaaIST, No. 74 (Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
122 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
123 Biddle v. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). Cf. also Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333,380 (1867) ; Burdick v. United States, 238 U.S. 79 (1915).
124 Nixon Pardon, at 93, 94, 96.
125 Cf. W. HU-MBERT, TE PARONnw PowER or TE PRESiDENT (1941).
126 Id., ch. 1.
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pardon of former President Nixon, like so much in the Watergate crisis,
the magnitude of the issues has made orthodox criminal process almost
irrelevant. The ultimate good of the common weal, it may be suggested, has
been best served by uncovering as much of the truth as possible. Whether
pardons, "use" immunity, suspended sentences, or release after short im-
prisonment have in fact uncovered as much of the truth as possible, will
remain a question for historians to debate.
V. The Constitutional Future
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Its Unanticipated Uses
Among the landmark documents of the Watergate crisis-the Select
Committee's Final Report, the final impeachment report of the House
Judiciary Committee, Nixon v. Sirica, and United States v. Nixon-the
twenty-fifth amendment to the Constitution may prove to be the most sig-
nificant. That amendment was ratified with one purpose uppermost-the
preservation of executive succession in circumstances similar to those of
President Kennedy's assassination and President Johnson's known his-
tory of heart attack. But its language was broader and more general, and
in the context of Watergate it proved more significant as a factor facili-
tating the governing process than its original sponsors had ever antici-
pated.
Beyond that, the amendment may offer remedies for future crises if
it is implemented by appropriate legislation. The resignation of former
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, the appointment of Gerald Ford, and his
appointment of his own successor upon his advancement to the Presi-
dency, 2 7 provoked a certain decrying of a procedure which has given the
nation its first unelected President and Vice President. In reply one may
suggest, first, that the people of the United States acquiesced in that situa-
tion when they ratified the amendment, and, second, that the result is not
much different from what it would have been had the idea of an Electoral
College ever worked as the Founding Fathers assumed that it would.
There have been various proposals to modify the procedure after the
Agnew-Ford-Nixon-Ford-Rockefeller "domino" experience. Representa-
tive Henry Reuss of Wisconsin offered a "no confidence" amendment
which, if passed, would have required that in the event of a "no confidence"
vote by a stipulated majority of both houses of Congress, both the execu-
127 Cf. Hearings on Ford Vice-Presidential Nomination Before House Judiciary Comm.,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on Rockefeller Nomination Before Senate Judiciary
Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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tive and legislative branches would stand for a new election. 128 This pro-
posal would require almost a total reorientation of American governmental
principles in favor of the British system of parliamentary government. Its
chief virtue is its attempt to preserve electoral control over both political
branches of government. It is suggested that this virtue is more apparent
than real-first, in view of the total change in both theory and practice of
constitutional government in the United States which would be required, 29
and, second, in view of the fundamental problem which Watergate pre-
sented and which the Reuss proposal would not reach.
An alternative suggestion has been to make still greater use of the
twenty-fifth amendment by implementing legislation, providing for the
Vice President to become Acting President in the case of presidential dis-
ability. 130 While admittedly the original concept of disability in the Ken-
nedy-Johnson context was one of physical or mental condition, the language
is general enough to admit of legal incapacity as well. Indeed, this was a
specific alternative considered in the final weeks of the Nixon administra-
tion.' It has ample precedent in the judicial disability and removal com-
missions which have been established in a number of states'82 and would
be compatible with the Ervin Committee's proposal for a Public Attorney,
as well as the pending bill to establish an Office of Congressional Legal Ser-
vices.
Under the terms of such a bill, a nonpartisan commission of public
persons would make an objective determination of the fact of presidential
disability. When the disability was physical or mental, the commission
would rely upon medical experts; when it was legal, the commission would
proceed along the lines of the rules and procedures of the Ervin Commit-
tee or its successor proposed in S. 4227 .133 Continuing review of the dis-
ability question would be provided, until it was resolved by removal, res-
ignation, end of the term, or a finding that the disability itself had been
terminated.3
While such a proposal is essentially an invitation to an improved
alternative, it does take advantage of the fact that the twenty-fifth amend-
128 H.J. Res. No. 903, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
129W. WISON;, CONSITUTIONAL GovERNiaNT IN THE UNITED STATES 40-44 (1908).
130 Cf. Swindler, Accountability: The Constitutional Goal, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 459,
466 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Accountability).
131 Nixon Pardon, 154.
132 On Mar. 7, 1975, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia introduced S. 1110, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975), titled a judicial Tenure Act, intended to provide procedures for retirement and
removal of federal judges along lines similar to the disciplinary commissions of a number of
states.
13 Supra note 73.
134 Cf. Accountability, supra note 129, at 469-71.
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ment looked to the possibility of "such... body as Congress may by law
provide."' 35 Its desirability in an age of chronic stress and constantly
shifting emotional and material pressures requires little argument. 36 Al-
ready the American people seem to be an age removed from the relatively
uncomplicated problem of presidential succession which was the primary
concern of the amendment in the beginning. If Watergate is indeed ulti-
mately a question of how to preserve public morality in a complex po-
litical and economic environment, it would be unduly optimistic to assume
that there will be no need for a legislative mechanism such as this in the
future.
A Restatement of American Constitutional Theory
There is coincidence, if not symbolism, in the fact that the constitu-
tional crisis of 1973-1974 occurred on the eve of the bicentennial of Amer-
ican independence. To paraphrase Tom Paine, political immorality, "like
hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the
harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph."13 The Republic ex-
perienced Watergate in an unparalleled era of international tensions, do-
mestic depression, and social discontent. While pundits widely proclaimed
that public opinion polls held government in low esteem, the fact is that
the system remained stable, and the constitutional machinery, perhaps
fortuitously, operated without stress or stalling.
This is not to say that the Constitution after Watergate will ever be
the same. It has already received fundamental glosses on the nature of
executive-as well as legislative and judicial-power. Unlike the vastly
greater proportion of constitutional law, which concerns the powers of
government in respect of interstate affairs, the Bill of Rights, and the four-
teenth amendment, the cases decided in 1973-1974 concern the balancing
of functions within government itself. These subjects have not undergone
such thorough scrutiny since 1787, and recall Hamilton's opening phrase
in The Federalist:
It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved
to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they
are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident
and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are
135 U.S. CoxsT., amend. XXV, § 4.
136 Cf. E. CnES, PamSmENT NIxoN's PSYCIATRIc PROFm (1973), ch. 4.
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arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the area in which that decision
is to be made .... 138
The theory of separated powers, of checks and balances, as Hamilton
and Madison understood, took account of the fact that temptation is ever
present in positions of authority and responsibility. The separation of func-
tions in the first three Articles of the Constitution was expected to prevent
the concentration of all these functions into a single office. The checks and
balances were intended to qualify and regulate even the functions vested
in a particular office. The gradual accretion of adjective law relating to
these offices was presumed to insure the working of the "interdependence"
that Madison endorsed.' It remains to be seen whether Watergate leaves
a legacy of clarifying judicial guidelines and legislative remedy.
Item: The definition of executive discretion is now recognized as a
judicial function, and its use is judicially reviewable.'40
Item:
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential commu-
nications....
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our
historic commitment to the rule of law.141
Item: The use of public or private funds to finance violations of elec-
tion laws, fraudulent infiltration of election campaigns for espionage and
sabotage purposes, and intentional misrepresentation of a candidate for
elective office-already susceptible of liability under existing statutes-
will presumably be made more explicit. 42
Item: The investigation and prosecution of wrongdoing in executive
office is properly the function of a government office independent of both
political branches. It may eventuate in the establishment of an office of
Public Attorney.14 3
Item: The twenty-fifth amendment anticipates that through imple-
menting legislation, Congress may establish a commission on legal disa-
bility or incapacity in the President which can scrutinize objectively the
1 3 8 THm FEDERALIST, No. 1, at 3 (Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
139 Id., No. 48.
140 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973).
141 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
142 Cf. FINAL REPoRT (Watergate), 564-77.
143 S. 4227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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propriety of executive behavior and refer its findings to appropriate in-
vestigating authority.144
These may be regarded as the actual and prospective constitutional
results of Watergate. In evaluating them, it is appropriate to recall the
comment of Senator Ervin, as relevant in 1776 as in the present: "Law is
not self-executing. Unfortunately, at times its execution rests in the hands
of those who are faithless to it. And even when its enforcement is com-
mitted to those who revere it, law merely deters some human beings from
offending, and punishes other human beings for offending. It does not make
men good." 45
144 Cf. Accountability, supra note 130, at 467-68.
145 FiNAI, Raxor (Watergate), at 1103.
